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Why were ex-communists returned to power in many transition countries so soon 
after they were vanquished in popular revolutions? Why didn’t these ex-communists 
immediately reverse the previous policies, but in fact in many cases continue market-
oriented reforms? Using a political economy model, the first half of the thesis 
provides new answers to these questions and shows that they are linked.  The model 
analyzes the interaction between voters and political parties over two electoral terms.  
In one prominent equilibrium, right wing parties are elected for the first term and 
implement radical market-oriented reforms, but the second elections are won by ex-
communists, who continue with the reforms. This equilibrium occurs in countries 
with somewhat low levels of corruption, high uncertainty, and moderate distance 
between political parties.  Differences in conditions that lead to other types of 
equilibria are analyzed, for example the delayed reforms in Russia or the gradual but 
consistent reforms in Slovenia.
The second half of the thesis empirically analyzes the causes of policy reversals in 
both transition and Latin American countries.  Indexes of reforms are used to identify 
those time periods in which reversals occur.  Using the political economy model of 
the first half of the thesis plus other theories of political behavior, variables are 
identified that could affect the decisions of politicians on whether to reverse reforms 
or to move forward.  The estimated relationships show that external constraints from 
international financial markets or supranational organizations are important factors 
preventing policy reversals.  Macroeconomic crises, usually thought to lead to more 
market reforms, do not necessarily do so.  More corruption leads to more policy 
reversals, as does less democratic government. This first attempt to capture the basic 
causes of reversals shows that they are the same in both regions, for example very 
low or very high debt service obligations, or the absence of an external disciplining 
force, such as the promise of future entry into the European Union.
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